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THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE: EMPLOYING
THE “GREATEST LEGAL ENGINE EVER
INVENTED FOR THE DISCOVERY OF TRUTH”1
TO PROMOTE JUSTICE IN CRIMINAL COURTS
Ani Oganesian
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2014, two friends, Hull and Corzette, planned on attending a
music festival together.2 They purchased three bags of heroin from
Trent, a known dealer.3 They then picked up the bags from Land, one
of Trent’s dealers, and headed to the music festival.4 At a nearby park,
Hull cooked the heroin and Corzette injected it.5 When Corzette
passed out, an unworried Hull returned to enjoy the musical
festivities.6 When he later returned to the park, he found that Corzette
was still passed out, with vomit on his clothes.7 Hull left Corzette in
his car overnight “believing him to be fine.”8 The next day, Hull found
Corzette dead in the car.9
After some time, Hull contacted the police and cooperated with
the officers to make an undercover purchase from Trent and Land,
which led to their arrests.10 Eventually, Land pleaded guilty and
1. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970) (quoting 5 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, ET AL.,
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1367 (3d ed. 1940)).
 J.D. Candidate, May 2019, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.S., Business Management,
Woodbury University. I wish to thank Professor Eric Miller for his invaluable guidance and
teaching, the members of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review for their impeccable work, and
my family and friends for their love and support. Special thanks to my husband for his unwavering
encouragement throughout the writing process.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

United States v. Trent, 863 F.3d 699, 701 (7th Cir. 2017).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 701–02.
Id. at 702.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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agreed to testify with Hull against Trent at trial.11 Trent was charged
with heroin distribution resulting in death, which carries a twenty-year
minimum sentence.12 Trent’s defense counsel sought to impeach Hull
and Land by exposing their desires to avoid twenty-year minimum
sentences by testifying.13 The district court found it sufficient to refer
to the sentences as “substantial,” finding that any additional
information would “improperly sway the jury’s decision in Trent’s
case.”14 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that
the cross-examination was “thorough” and “did not offend the core
values of the Confrontation Clause.”15 This flawed line of reasoning,
followed by the majority of United States circuit courts, disrupts the
constitutional rights of criminal defendants throughout the nation.
The Sixth Amendment was passed by Congress on
September 25, 1789 and ratified on December 15, 1791.16 It provides
that:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State
and district wherein the crime shall have been committed,
which district shall have been previously ascertained by law,
and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation;
to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and
to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.17
The Amendment serves an important mission: to protect the integrity
of the “truth-determining process” in criminal proceedings.18 By
virtue of this mission, the Confrontation Clause affords criminal
defendants the “fundamental right” to cross-examine witnesses who
testify against them.19 “Cross-examination is the principal means by

11. Id. at 703.
12. Id. at 702–03. Land and Hull also faced the same charge. Id.
13. Id. at 701, 703.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 706. Trent filed a petition for certiorari on December 8, 2017. United States v. Trent,
863 F.3d 699 (7th Cir. 2017), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Dec. 8, 2017) (No. 17-830).
16. Stephanos Bibas & Jeffrey L. Fisher, Common Interpretation: The Sixth Amendment,
NAT’L CONST. CTR., https://constitutioncenter.org/interactiveconstitution/amendments/amendment-vi (last visited Feb. 8, 2018).
17. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added).
18. See Phillips v. Neil, 452 F.2d 337, 348 (6th Cir. 1971) (quoting Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S.
74, 89 (1970)).
19. See Dutton, 400 U.S. at 101 (citing Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965)).
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which the believability of a witness and the truth of his testimony are
tested.”20 It is a procedural guarantee that enables defendants to
challenge the government’s evidence. Thus, sufficient crossexamination is especially important where the witness, who has been
indicted himself, has agreed to testify pursuant to a cooperation
agreement with the government.21
In light of these concerns, U.S. courts have consistently discussed
restrictions on the scope of cross-examination.22 But the Supreme
Court has yet to address a critical issue: the extent to which criminal
defendants may cross-examine witnesses about their cooperation
agreements with the government.
To determine the acceptable scope, it is important to understand
the underlying purpose of the Confrontation Clause, how witnesses
obtain cooperation agreements with the government, and the function
that juries are historically meant to serve. Part II of this Note details
the history and purpose of the Confrontation Clause. Part III focuses
on the government’s process of obtaining cooperation agreements in
exchange for testimony.
Part IV addresses the circuit split. Part IV.A discusses the
minority approach adopted by the Third, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits,
which permits defendants to inquire into the specific sentences or
charges that witnesses have avoided or hope to avoid by cooperating
with the government.23 Part IV.B details the contrasting majority
approach adopted by the First, Second, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth,
and Eleventh circuits, which bars defendants from probing into the
specifics of government witnesses’ agreements.24 Part V critiques the
majority approach, focusing on how such limitations on crossexamination deprive defendants of their confrontation rights and
frustrate the jury’s ability to perform its function. Part VI proposes a
bright-line rule allowing for liberal cross-examination of government
witnesses about their cooperation agreements.

20. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974).
21. See United States v. Onori, 535 F.2d 938, 945 (5th Cir. 1976) (“This right is especially
important with respect to accomplices or other witnesses who may have substantial reason to
cooperate with the government.”).
22. See Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1016 (1988) (providing a list of decisions that reflect
these two inquiries).
23. See United States v. Dimora, 843 F. Supp. 2d 799, 843 (N.D. Ohio 2012).
24. Id.
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II. THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE: A WALK THROUGH HISTORY
A criminal defendant’s right to confront adverse witnesses was
far from a novel idea when the founding fathers ratified the Sixth
Amendment of the Constitution. It is a right that “‘comes to us on
faded parchment’ with a lineage that traces back to the beginnings of
Western legal culture.”25
A. Confrontation Rights in Early Rome and England
Defendants’ confrontation rights can be traced to Roman law. The
beginnings of this right first appear in the fifth book of the New
Testament, the Acts of the Apostles (“Acts”).26 Roman governor
Festus explained in the Acts, “It is not the manner of the Romans to
deliver any man up to die before the accused has met his accusers face
to face, and has been given a chance to defend himself against
the charges.”27
The right to confront an accuser was later incorporated as a
procedural requirement of Roman criminal trial, as described in
Cicero’s Verrine Orations (“Orations”).28 In Orations, Cicero writes
about his prosecution of then-governor of Sicily, Gaius Verres, who
was accused of misconduct in office.29 One such instance of
misconduct alleged was when Verres sat as a judge in the prosecution
of an accused, Sthenius, on two charges: forgery and a capital
offense.30 Both trials were conducted without the presence of
Sthenius, and the second trial was conducted without the presence of
his accuser.31 Sthenius was found guilty at both trials.32 Cicero found
that both convictions, made in Sthenius’s absence and in the absence
of his accuser, were violations of the defendant’s rights.33
Sir Walter Raleigh’s 1603 trial for charges of treason marks the
touchstone for defendants’ confrontation rights in England.34 Raleigh
25. Coy, 487 U.S. at 1015 (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 174 (1970) (Harlan, J.,
concurring) (citation omitted)).
26. Frank R. Herrmann & Brownlow M. Speer, Facing the Accuser: Ancient and Medieval
Precursors of the Confrontation Clause, 34 VA. J. INT’L L. 481, 486 (1994).
27. Coy, 487 U.S. at 1015–16 (quoting Acts 25:16).
28. Herrmann & Speer, supra note 26, at 486.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 481–82, 543.
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was convicted primarily based upon the out-of-court testimony of his
alleged co-conspirator, Lord Cobham, which was read to the jury.35
“[L]et Cobham be here,” Raleigh begged the judges, “Call my accuser
before my face.”36 Raleigh argued that “false witnesses” could only be
revealed by asking them questions.37 The judges denied Raleigh’s
request, and he was sentenced to death.38 In the aftermath of Raleigh’s
death, cross-examination of adverse witnesses became a facet of
English common-law, which later provided the basis for the Sixth
Amendment.39
B. Adoption of the Sixth Amendment
The Federal Constitution, as originally proposed, did not account
for confrontation rights.40 This omission was opposed by many, as it
was seen as a shift back into English civil-law practices of the
inquisitorial nature—namely, conducting pretrial examination in the
absence of the defendant.41 Eventually, the Founders accounted for the
omission by introducing the Sixth Amendment in the Bill of Rights.42
The Sixth Amendment was a means through which the Founders
“sought to strengthen [the] vigorous adversarial process” and depart
from the inquisitorial implications that its absence might have had on
criminal trials.43
The text of the Sixth Amendment and the recorded debates at the
Constitutional Convention provide little guidance as to its underlying
purpose.44 As a result, the Sixth Amendment, and particularly the
Confrontation Clause, have been the focus of many cases before the
Supreme Court. Confrontation Clause inquiries became even more
prevalent after 1965, when the Court held in Pointer v. Texas45 that

35. Id. at 545.
36. Id. (alteration in original); see Mathew Lyons, The Trial of Sir Walter Raleigh: A
Transcript, WRITER & HISTORIAN (Nov. 18, 2011),
https://mathewlyons.wordpress.com/2011/11/18/the-trial-of-sir-walter-ralegh-a-transcript/.
37. Lyons, supra note 36.
38. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 44, 48 (2004).
39. Id. at 481–82.
40. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 48.
41. See id.
42. See id. at 49.
43. Bibas & Fisher, supra note 16.
44. Jonathan Clow, Throwing a Toy Wrench in the “Greatest Legal Engine”: Child Witnesses
and the Confrontation Clause, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 793, 796 (2015).
45. 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
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the Sixth Amendment extends to states through the Fourteenth
Amendment.46
Interpretation of the Confrontation Clause has mainly involved
two issues: “the admissibility of out-of-court statements” and
“restrictions on the scope of cross-examination.”47 As the heart of this
Note involves the latter inquiry, I will turn to an analysis of Supreme
Court decisions which have helped define the scope of the
Confrontation Clause.
C. The Supreme Court Interpreting the Scope of the Confrontation
Clause
In order to determine the appropriate scope of cross-examining
government witnesses about their cooperation agreements, it is
essential to understand not only that cross-examination is an
enumerated right conferred by the Confrontation Clause, but also why
cross-examination is a constitutionally-protected right. Based upon an
analysis of the historical underpinnings identified supra, the Supreme
Court has recognized that a primary purpose of the Confrontation
Clause is to ensure the “accuracy of the truth-determining process in
criminal trials.”48 As Justice Brown notably wrote in one of the earliest
cases dealing with the Confrontation Clause:
The primary object of the [Confrontation Clause was] to
prevent depositions or ex parte affidavits, such as were
sometimes admitted in civil cases, being used against the
prisoner in lieu of a personal examination and crossexamination of the witness, in which the accused has an
opportunity, not only of testing the recollection and sifting
the conscience of the witness, but of compelling him to stand
face to face with the jury in order that they may look at him,
and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in
which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief.49

46. Id. at 403.
47. Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1016 (1988).
48. See Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970) (“[T]he mission of the Confrontation Clause
is to advance a practical concern for the accuracy of the truth-determining process in criminal trials
by assuring that ‘the trier of fact (has) a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the
[testimony].’”) (second alteration in original) (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 161
(1970)).
49. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242–43 (1895) (emphasis added).
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This procedural guarantee of cross-examination allows
defendants to “safeguard[] . . . the truth” by testing witnesses’
“veracity.”50 In essence, when witnesses are placed before a jury under
oath, face-to-face with the defendant they are implicating, and are
vigorously cross-examined by defense counsel with respect to their
potential biases, two results are achieved: (1) witnesses are “more
likely to testify truthfully;”51 and (2) the jury is better able to assess
the full extent of witnesses’ credibility and prejudices towards the
defendant.52 The jury’s assessment of witness credibility will, in turn,
assist the jury in determining whether that particular testimony
incriminates the defendant.
Cross-examination is not an absolute right. It is limited, pursuant
to Federal Rule of Evidence 611, to “the subject matter of the direct
examination and matters affecting the witness’s credibility.”53 Thus,
defendants have “the opportunity to show that a witness is biased, or
that the testimony is exaggerated or unbelievable” by “delv[ing] into
the witness’ story to test the witness’ perceptions and memory . . . [to]
impeach, i.e., discredit, the witness.”54 Limiting cross-examination is
within the “broad discretion” of the trial judge,55 but “discretion in the
area of bias evidence becomes operative only after the constitutionally
required threshold level of inquiry has been afforded the defendant.”56
Two Supreme Court decisions have discussed “the scope of crossexamination [of government witnesses] permitted” by trial courts and
concluded that the limitations on cross-examination violated the
defendants’ confrontation rights.57 In both cases, the Court found that
the defendants’ inquiries were well within the permissible scope of
cross-examination and served to reveal witnesses’ biases and
credibility to the jury.58

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
(1974).
55.
56.
57.
58.

See Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243, 273 (1913).
Clow, supra note 44, at 798.
See Green, 399 U.S. at 158.
FED. R. EVID. 611(b).
Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 51–52 (1987); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316
See Marshall v. Walker, 464 U.S. 951, 952 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Brown v. Powell, 975 F.2d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 1992) (Pollak, J., dissenting).
See Davis, 415 U.S. at 315; Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986).
See Davis, 415 U.S. at 315; Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 673.
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1. Davis v. Alaska
The Supreme Court’s has stated that its decision in Davis v.
Alaska59 exemplifies the scope of cross-examination.60 In Davis, the
Court considered whether “the Confrontation Clause requires that a
defendant in a criminal case be allowed to impeach the credibility of
a prosecution witness by cross-examination directed at possible bias
deriving from the witness’ probationary status.”61
There, the defendant, Davis, was charged with stealing a safe
containing cash and checks from a local bar.62 The safe was later found
near Green’s home.63 Green became a key prosecution witness when
he revealed, during interrogation at the police station, that he had seen
a man near the area where the safe was found holding a crowbar.64
Green later identified Davis in a line-up.65
At the time Green testified to seeing Davis near his home, Green
was on juvenile probation for having “burglarize[ed] two cabins.”66
Prior to his testimony at trial, the prosecution sought a protective order
to prevent mention of Green’s juvenile record.67 Defense counsel
objected, arguing that any such mention would be necessary to reveal
Green’s bias and prejudice, and demonstrate that he may have feared
“possible jeopardy to his probation” when the safe was found near his
home and “made a hasty and faulty identification of [Davis] to shift
suspicion away from himself.”68 The trial court granted the protective
order.69
At trial, defense counsel questioned Green about whether he felt
anxious that the police officers might have believed he was
responsible for stealing the safe, given that it was found on his
property.70 Green responded that he did not.71 The trial court did not

59. 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
60. See Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 19 (1985).
61. Davis, 415 U.S. at 309.
62. Id. at 309–10.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 310.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 310–11.
67. Id. at 310.
68. Id. at 311.
69. Id. In doing so, the trial court relied upon Alaska state statutes, which provide that evidence
of a minor’s juvenile status is not admissible. Id.
70. Id. at 312.
71. Id. at 313.
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allow any further cross-examination into the matter, and Davis was
ultimately convicted.72
The Supreme Court reversed Davis’s convictions, finding
violation of Davis’s Sixth Amendment right of confrontation.73 The
Court reasoned that “[t]he accuracy and truthfulness of Green’s
testimony were key elements in the State’s case against [Davis].”74
The defense sought to admit Green’s juvenile record to allow the jury
to make the inference that Green may have been biased because he
was concerned about being a possible suspect and because of his
probationary status.75 The Court found that Green’s entitlement to
“testify free from embarrassment and with his reputation unblemished
must fall before the right of [Davis] to seek out the truth in the process
of defending himself.”76
The Court further opined that cross-examination is “‘not for the
idle purpose of gazing upon the witness.’ . . . [It] is the principal means
by which the believability of a witness and the truth of his testimony
are tested.”77 One way to reveal the truth of such a witness’s testimony
is to explore his “partiality” using questioning that may “reveal[]
possible biases, prejudices, or ulterior motives . . . as they may relate
directly to issues or personalities in the case at hand.”78 The Court
noted that without further questioning, the jury had no understanding
of why Green might have been biased and any such suggestion by the
defense would have appeared “speculative.”79 Finally, the Court found
that the State’s interest in protecting Green’s juvenile record “cannot
require yielding of so vital a constitutional right as the effective crossexamination for bias of an adverse witness.”80
The Davis Court’s language accentuates the bedrock principle of
the Confrontation Clause: cross-examination is a procedural right that
affords defendants the opportunity to reveal witnesses’ ulterior
motives and prejudices.81 This ruling provides that a trial court abuses
72. Id. at 313–14.
73. Id. at 315.
74. Id. at 317.
75. Id. at 317–18.
76. Id. at 320.
77. Id. at 316 (quoting 3A JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, ET AL., EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON
LAW § 940 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1970)).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 318.
80. Id. at 320.
81. Id. at 316.
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its discretion when it limits inquiry aimed at exposing witness
credibility even if the questioning has already revealed some potential
bias.82 Probing a witness about facts that would make him more or less
likely to testify without the “impartiality expected of a witness at
trial”83 is necessary for the defense to develop its theory of bias in full.
Moreover, the Court’s finding that “the right of confrontation is
paramount”84 to the State’s statutory protection of juvenile offenders
suggests that a defendant’s right to cross-examine an adverse witness
with respect to his credibility is a supreme right which can seldom be
disturbed.
2. Delaware v. Van Arsdall
Over a decade later, in Delaware v. Van Arsdall,85 the Supreme
Court was faced with a closely-related issue: whether defense counsel
was inappropriately prohibited from cross-examining a prosecution
witness about his agreement to testify “in exchange for the dismissal
of an unrelated criminal charge against him.”86
There, Van Arsdall was convicted of stabbing Epps to death in
her apartment following a New Year’s Eve party.87 Fleetwood, who
was staying in a neighboring apartment, testified at trial.88 He
“recount[ed] uncontroverted facts about the party” and stated that he
saw Van Arsdall sitting in Epps’s apartment from the doorway.89
In exchange for Fleetwood’s testimony at trial, the prosecution
dismissed a pending, unrelated public drunkenness charge against
him.90 During cross-examination, defense counsel attempted, to no
avail, to elicit information about the charge to expose Fleetwood’s
motivation for testifying.91 Instead, the judge allowed crossexamination about the charge to occur “outside the presence of the
jury.”92
82. Id. at 318.
83. Id. at 318.
84. Id. at 319.
85. 475 U.S. 673 (1986).
86. Id. Van Arsdall is the only time that the Court has specifically discussed whether
confrontation rights are violated when a trial court limits cross-examination of a government
witness’s cooperation agreement.
87. Id. at 674.
88. Id. at 675.
89. Id. at 675.
90. Id. at 676.
91. Id.
92. Id.
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The Court found that the trial court had violated Van Arsdall’s
confrontation rights, providing that “the exposure of a witness’
motivation in testifying is a proper and important function of the
constitutionally protected right of cross-examination.”93 The Court
recognized the wide discretion a trial court has in limiting crossexamination due to basic concerns such as “harassment, prejudice,
confusion of the issues, the witness’ safety, or interrogation that is
repetitive or only marginally relevant.”94
However, the Court found that insofar as “all inquiry” into
Fleetwood’s possible bias was limited, the jury was denied the chance
to consider his “motive for favoring the prosecution in his
testimony.”95 In concluding, the Court proposed the following:
We think that a criminal defendant states a violation of the
Confrontation Clause by showing that he was prohibited
from engaging in otherwise appropriate cross-examination
designed to show a prototypical form of bias on the part of
the witness, and thereby “to expose to the jury the facts from
which jurors . . . could appropriately draw inferences relating
to the reliability of the witness.”96
As Van Arsdall and Davis provide, cross-examination guarantees
defendants the right to reveal witnesses’ biases (no matter how
marginal they may be), essentially equipping the jury with a tool for
assessing the credibility and weight to afford those witnesses’
testimonies. While cross-examination may be limited, these opinions
and the history of the Confrontation Clause dictate that exposing a
cooperating witness’s motive for testifying against a criminal
defendant is a primary and significant component of the constitutional
right to confront.
III. SECURING COOPERATION AGREEMENTS: NO CEILING ON
GOVERNMENT DISCRETION
Cooperating co-defendants often serve as key and sometimes sole
witnesses against defendants in criminal proceedings, particularly in
93. Id. at 678–79 (citing Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 315, 316–17 (1974)). Dissenting on other
grounds, Justice Marshall maintained that cross-examination is such an important right, and that
the denial of that right should have resulted in the reversal of Van Arsdall’s conviction entirely. Id.
at 688 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
94. Id. at 679 (majority opinion).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 680 (quoting Davis, 415 U.S. at 318).
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drug cases.97 This practice carries with it a dangerous reality: such
testimony is often replete with fabrication and/or exaggeration due to
the witnesses’ incentives to “please” the government.98 This section
will discuss a simplified process of how the government obtains
witnesses, and the problems posed by this process.
A. How Defendants Become Cooperating Witnesses
Obtaining witnesses to testify against a defendant in exchange for
cooperation agreements is a two-part process that engages the
investigator and the prosecutor.99 The process involves the extensive
exercise of prosecutorial discretion and control, which injects inherent
bias into the witnesses’ ultimate testimony.100 Cooperating witnesses
often have one primary goal: to comply with the government’s
requests in hopes of a beneficial deal,101 thereby raising the concern
that such testimony may be biased, exaggerated, and sometimes even
untruthful. As such, the process has been critiqued by legal scholars
as being “unjust, corrupt, and undemocratic.”102
1. Role of the Investigator
Investigating officers or agents typically engage in the first
contact with potential witnesses, as they are responsible for arrests and
investigations, and they have “the most information about and
influence over [potential witnesses].”103 Investigators “recruit”
witnesses in various ways.104 The most common method is to offer an
arrested individual the opportunity to “mitigate his situation” by
providing certain information and cooperating with the arresting
officer.105 Investigators may also arrest an individual that has
committed a particular crime for the purpose of turning him into an
informant.106 “Informed bluff[ing]” is another method utilized.107 In
97. See ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, SNITCHING: CRIMINAL INFORMANTS AND THE EROSION OF
AMERICAN JUSTICE 46 (2011).
98. Id. at 22.
99. Id. at 17–18.
100. Id. at 49–50.
101. See id. at 22.
102. See ALBERT W. DZUR, PUNISHMENT, PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY, AND THE JURY 143
(2012).
103. NATAPOFF, supra note 97, at 18.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.

(6)51.4_OGANESIAN (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE

9/26/2019 11:46 PM

693

this method, an investigator allows an individual to believe that there
is an indictable case against him, but in reality, the investigator has not
produced enough evidence for a prosecutor to press charges.108
Afraid of the possibility of being charged, such individuals often
agree to comply with officers’ requests.109 Illegal methods are also
employed. For example, officers may target a potential witness (who
they know is prone to criminal activity) and wait until he commits a
crime to arrest him.110 They then propose a favorable deal to him in
exchange for his cooperation.111 Although police and investigators do
not have the authority to induce official cooperation agreements, they
may make promises that the prosecutor will.112
2. Role of the Prosecutor
The prosecutor’s practice of obtaining plea bargains with
defendants was never “voted upon by state or federal
legislatures[,] . . . emerged with very little scrutiny,” and essentially
“sidelines” the judge, allowing prosecutors to take “center stage.”113
Prosecutors have the sole discretion to press charges against arrested
individuals.114 Prosecutors also have the power to alter or drop
criminal charges against individuals in exchange for their
cooperation.115 This charging power is “unreviewable by courts,”
except in the rare instance when there is reason to believe the
“prosecutor has charged someone on an impermissible basis such as
race, vindictiveness, or to punish the defendant for exercising his
constitutional rights.”116 In addition, prosecutors may recommend
lenient and reduced sentencing to a trial judge.117 Judges are highly
deferential to prosecutors’ recommendations and rely heavily upon
“the government’s substantial assistance motion” and “evaluation of
the assistance received” in making sentencing determinations.118
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 18–19.
111. Id. at 19.
112. Id. at 48.
113. DZUR, supra note 102, at 144–45.
114. NATAPOFF, supra note 97, at 49.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 50.
117. Id.
118. See Brian A. Jacobs, et al., Navigating the Cooperation Process in a Federal White Collar
Criminal Investigation, PRACTICAL LAW 8 (2017),
https://www.maglaw.com/publications/articles/2017-04-20-navigating-the-cooperation-process-
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When confronted with multiple defendants involved in a
particular crime, prosecutors apply a “utilitarian calculation, whereby
the relative dangerousness and culpability of each defendant is
evaluated.”119 This calculation results in a determination of whom to
prosecute and whom to offer a deal in exchange for his incriminating
testimony against the other.120
Two types of general agreements may be arranged with
cooperating witnesses: cooperation agreements and immunity
orders.121 Immunized witnesses “typically face no criminal liability”
in exchange for their testimony.122 Conversely, witnesses who testify
pursuant to cooperation agreements are still prosecuted for their role
in the criminal offense, but are promised leniency (typically altered or
dropped charges, or a reduced sentence recommendation to the judge)
in exchange for their testimony.123 The cooperation agreement
essentially operates as a bilateral contract.124 The extent to which a
cooperating witness’s duty is considered fulfilled pursuant to the
agreement largely depends upon the prosecutor’s determination of the
“quality or utility of the witness’ testimony.”125
Only after determining that the witness’s testimony was
satisfactory is the government required to perform its end of the
bargain.126 Such “contingent plea agreements” have been consistently
upheld by courts.127 Consequently, if a prosecutor determines that the
witness’s testimony was not particularly incriminating, she may refuse
to afford the witness the benefit of the deal in its entirety. This

in-a-federal-white-collar-criminal-investigation/_res/id=Attachments/index=0/Navigating%20the
%20Cooperation%20Process%20in%20a%20Federal%20White%20Collar%20Criminal%20In....
pdf.
119. Spencer Martinez, Bargaining for Testimony: Bias of Witnesses Who Testify in Exchange
for Leniency, 47 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 141, 144 (1999).
120. See id.
121. Robert R. Strang, Plea Bargaining, Cooperation Agreements, and Immunity Orders,
155TH INT’L TRAINING COURSE VISITING EXPERTS’ PAPERS,
http://www.unafei.or.jp/english/pdf/RS_No92/No92_05VE_Strang1.pdf
(last visited Feb. 9, 2018).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Martinez, supra note 119, at 148.
125. Id. at 149.
126. Id. at 148–49.
127. Id. at 149–50 (citing United States v. Valle-Ferrer, 739 F.2d 545 (11th Cir. 1984); United
States v. Kimble, 719 F.2d 1253 (5th Cir. 1983); United States v. Edwards, 549 F.2d 362 (5th Cir.
1977)).
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“pressure on the witness to please is extreme” and, thus, creates a
“plausible risk that the witness will commit perjury to do it.”128
The investigator’s tactical approach to securing witnesses,
coupled with the prosecutor’s wide discretion and power in charging
individuals or recommending reduced sentences triggers many
important concerns. First, it results in disproportionate sentencing.129
Defendants who commit the same crime may receive significantly
different penalties.130 This disproportionality undercuts the “important
civic interest in having public inquiry and adjudication” of criminal
offenses.131 As a result, criminal jurisprudence suffers.132
In addition to disproportionate sentencing, there is unequal
bargaining power between a criminal defendant and a prosecutor who
has the power to single-handedly change or, at the very least,
significantly influence a defendant’s penalty under the law. These
issues are particularly concerning when courts prohibit crossexamination of cooperating witnesses regarding the details of their
dealings with the prosecutor.133
How truthful will such witnesses be on the stand when faced with
the strong incentive to “please” the prosecutor to ensure that they
obtain what they have bargained for? How likely is it that a
cooperating witness will minimize his own role in the crime, shifting
the entire blame onto the defendant? These questions are best left for
the jury to assess, equipped with all the facts necessary in making such
a determination.
B. Cooperating Witness Testimony: True or False?
[E]ach contract for testimony is fraught with the real peril
that the proffered testimony will not be truthful, but simply
factually contrived to “get” a target of sufficient interest to
induce concessions from the government. . . .
128. Martinez, supra note 119, at 149.
129. DZUR, supra note 102, at 144.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 145 (quoting John H. Langbein, On the Myth of Written Constitutions: The
Disappearance of Criminal Jury Trial, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 119, 124 (1992)).
132. See DZUR, supra note 102, at 145.
133. The unequal bargaining power of prosecutors and defendants and the disproportionate
sentencing that results from cooperation agreements are beyond the scope of this Note. However,
these issues underscore the many problems with prosecutorial discretion and how the limitation on
cross-examination of government witnesses becomes even more problematic when considering that
unfettered discretion.
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[R]ewarded criminals [] represent a great threat to the
mission of the criminal justice system.134
Cooperating witnesses have “predictable and powerful
inducements to lie.”135 In fact, with liberty and sometimes even life at
stake, “[i]t is difficult to imagine a greater motivation to lie.”136 Justice
Ginsburg has noted that the “Court has long recognized the ‘serious
questions of credibility’ informers pose.”137
In her book, Snitching, former Assistant Federal Public Defender
Alexandra Natapoff explores this issue by tracing several studies
which reveal the extent of cooperating witnesses’ false testimonies.138
A study conducted by Northwestern Law School’s Center on
Wrongful Convictions in 2004 indicated that 45.9 percent of wrongful
capital convictions hinged on untruthful informant testimony.139
University of Michigan Law School professor Samuel Gross’s studies
showed that close to “50 percent of wrongful murder convictions
involved perjury” by witnesses “who stood to gain from the false
testimony.”140
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Trott has compared the use
of cooperating witnesses against other criminals to a scalpel—“a
marvelous tool . . . [that] can remove a deadly tumor or repair a
diseased heart.”141 He warned, however, that “as in the case of a
scalpel, the careless, unskilled, or unprepared use of cooperating
criminal as a witness has the capacity to backfire so severely that an
otherwise solid case becomes irreparably damaged.”142 Judge Trott
has noted that one such damaging aspect is the untruthful cooperating
witness:
Criminals are likely to say and do almost anything to get
what they want, especially when what they want is to get out
134. Northern Mariana Islands v. Bowie, 243 F.3d 1109, 1124 (9th Cir. 2001).
135. NATAPOFF, supra note 97, at 70.
136. Id. (quoting United States v. Cervantes-Pacheco, 826 F.2d 310, 315 (5th Cir. 1987)).
137. Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 701 (2004) (citing On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747,
757 (1952)).
138. See NATAPOFF, supra note 97, at 69–81.
139. Id. at 70.
140. Id. (citing Samuel R. Gross et. al., Exonerations in the United States, 1989 Through 2003,
95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523, 543–44 (2005)). For a more comprehensive illustration of the
studies conducted, see NATAPOFF, supra note 97, at 76–78.
141. Stephen S. Trott, The Use of a Criminal as a Witness: A Special Problem,
AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION LECTURE SUPPLEMENT
1 (Oct. 2007)
https://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/drugpolicy/informant_trott_outline.pdf.
142. Id. at 2.
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of trouble with the law. This willingness to do anything
includes not only truthfully spilling the beans on friends and
relatives, but also lying, committing perjury, manufacturing
evidence, soliciting others to corroborate their lies with more
lies, and double-crossing anyone with whom they come into
contact, including the prosecutor.143
Take, for example, the story of Marion “Mad Dog” Pruett.144
Pruett began his criminal career in 1971 when he robbed a bank.145 In
1975, he was imprisoned in Atlanta for a subsequent bank robbery.146
While in prison, he killed his cellmate, blamed it on another inmate,
and testified against him.147 In exchange for his testimony, which
resulted in the conviction of the innocent inmate, the government
released him through the Federal Witness Protection Program.148
Pruett then began a murderous rampage through the country, killing
four people.149 He later admitted that he had also killed his cellmate
and that his testimony against the convicted inmate had been a lie.150
Courts have repeatedly overturned convictions due to
determinations that government witnesses had fabricated their
testimonies.151 In United States v. D’Angelo,152 the district court
granted the defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal for a murder
conviction after finding that three of the government’s key
cooperating witnesses, the defendant’s accomplices, had provided
false testimony.153 Specifically, the accomplices lied about their own
involvement in the murder, as well as the circumstances of how the
murder had occurred.154 One of the accomplices even had a “sordid
history of perjury and subornation of perjury, of which the government
was aware.”155
143. Id. at 5.
144. Id. at 5–6.
145. Execution Set for ‘Mad Dog’ Pruett, AMARILLO GLOBE-NEWS (Apr. 11, 1999),
http://amarillo.com/stories/041199/tex_227-1142.shtml#.WqNvsBpwZol.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. See, e.g., N. Mariana Islands v. Bowie, 243 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2001); United States v.
D’Angelo, No. 02 CR 399(JG), 2004 WL 315237 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 2004).
152. No. 02 CR 399 (JG), 2004 WL 315237 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 2004).
153. Id. at *1.
154. Id. at *16–18.
155. Id. at *19.
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In Northern Mariana Islands v. Bowie,156 the Ninth Circuit
reversed the defendant’s convictions because the prosecution failed to
investigate a possible conspiracy among the accomplice witnesses to
testify against the defendant untruthfully.157 There, a group of men
were arrested in connection with a murder.158 Most of the group agreed
to “full cooperation” with the prosecution and to give “truthful
testimony” against the defendant, Bowie.159 The promises given in
exchange for their testimonies ranged from probation to pleading
guilty to charges lesser than murder, which carried nine-year
sentences.160
At trial, the witnesses “collectively paint[ed] an evidentiary
picture of Bowie’s personal responsibility for [the victim’s] death,”
and Bowie was convicted of premeditated murder and kidnapping.161
At trial, Bowie introduced evidence of a letter that was found in one
of the witness’s jail cells that read as follows:
Hey brod I want you to help me please for this problem that
were facing right now because if they know that Im the one
that did this theyre gonna put me in jail for life. I tried this
before. Brah this Is what we gonna do listen carefully okay
if we go to court on Thursday and they ask us questions how
the murder happens and who kill the philipino just say J.J.
because I already talk to John and Brasslley before I was
arrested but anyway don’t worry about Lucas because I talk
to Lucas that don’t tell the detectives that Im the one that did
this things.
You know what brah, don’t worry about this case because
well win this just imagine four against one I I even lied to my
lawyer about the incedent.162
Although the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the case had
been notified of the letter, he had instructed the Sergeant “not to do
anything with the letter, just to keep it until” it was needed.163

156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

243 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2001).
Id. at 1111.
Id. at 1112.
Id. at 1113.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1113.
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These examples, and many more, portray the inherent danger that
exists in allowing cooperating government witnesses to testify against
a criminal defendant. Undoubtedly, cooperating witnesses have been
and continue to be crucial in providing meaningful and necessary
testimony, particularly in cases where no other evidence exists.164 But
in order to ensure that defendants are afforded their confrontation
rights and are able to expose these potential biases, juries must be
given full disclosure.
In most jurisdictions, judges inform the jury that a witness has
cooperated with the government and is obtaining some benefit in
exchange for his testimony.165 Some even invite the jury to carefully
scrutinize such testimony.166 These are steps in the right direction, but
there is more that the criminal justice system can accomplish—starting
with expanding the scope of cross-examination.
IV. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT: HOW FAR IS TOO FAR?
The foregoing analysis raises the following questions: Do the
details of a witness’s plea deal speak to his credibility? Or is it
sufficient to simply know that the witness has cooperated in some way
with the government in exchange for his testimony? A majority of
U.S. courts have answered the latter question in the affirmative. In
doing so, these courts have found that informing the jury that a witness
is cooperating with the government is sufficient and have limited any
further inquiry into the details of the cooperation. On the other hand,
the minority of U.S. courts have held that specific cross-examination
of witnesses about their agreements with the government is necessary
in some circumstances.
A. The Majority Approach
The majority approach is as follows: the cross-examination of
witnesses about their agreements with the government should be
164. Martinez, supra note 119, at 142 (“In spite of advances in scientific and statistical
evidence, the success of a criminal prosecution continues to hinge primarily on witness testimony.
Such evidence is difficult to come by, especially in the case of more sophisticated criminals or
defendants who commit crimes through syndicates that insulate them from the relevant actus
reus.”).
165. NATAPOFF, supra note 97, at 76.
166. Id.; see Judicial Council of the United States Eleventh Judicial Circuit, Eleventh
Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions (Criminal Cases) (2016),
http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/courtdocs/clk/FormCriminalPatternJuryInstructio
ns2016Rev.pdf.
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limited to avoid jury confusion and nullification.167 These courts have
found that revealing the witnesses’ specific penalties and sentences are
not probative in exposing witness bias.168
The First Circuit has held that any value that an inquiry into the
“precise number of years” that a witness may avoid by testifying is
“outweighed by the potential for prejudice by having the jury learn
what penalties the defendants were facing.”169 In United States v.
Luciano-Mosquera,170 the defendants faced various charges
surrounding “a scheme to smuggle cocaine into Puerto Rico.”171 In
exchange for defendant Castillo-Ramos’s testimony against defendant
Pagan-San-Miguel, the prosecution dropped a firearms charge against
Castillo-Ramos.172 During cross-examination at trial, Pagan-SanMiguel’s defense counsel asked Castillo-Ramos if he was aware that
he would have faced a thirty-five-year sentence had the firearms
charge not been dropped.173 The district court sustained an objection
to the question.174 The Court of Appeals agreed with the district
court’s action, finding that although exposing the biases of witnesses
is important, the jury could have made “a discriminating appraisal of
the possible biases and motivations of the witnesses” without this
particular inquiry.175
In line with the First Circuit’s reasoning, the Second, Fourth, and
Eleventh Circuits have held that where defense counsel has had the
chance to elicit testimony about witnesses’ cooperation with the
government and expectations of reduced sentences, detailed crossexamination about the “specific penalties at stake” is impermissible.176
The Fourth Circuit has voiced the concern that “the jury might
‘nullify’ its verdict if it knew the extreme penalties faced by the
[defendants]” in a case where the witnesses faced the same charges as
the defendant.177 Specifically, the court found “that if the jury could

167. United States v. Dimora, 843 F. Supp. 2d 799, 843 (N.D. Ohio 2012).
168. Id. at 843–44.
169. United States v. Luciano-Mosquera, 63 F.3d 1142, 1153 (1st Cir. 1995).
170. 63 F.3d 1142, 1153 (1st Cir. 1995).
171. Id. at 1146–48.
172. Id. at 1153.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. (quoting Brown v. Powell, 975 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1992)).
176. United States v. Cropp, 127 F.3d 354, 358 (4th Cir. 1997); see United States v. Rushin,
844 F.3d 933, 940 (11th Cir. 2016); United States v. Reid, 300 F. App’x 50, 52 (2d Cir. 2008).
177. Cropp, 127 F.3d at 358.
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infer the very long sentences faced by the [defendants] from knowing
the sentences faced by the co-conspirators, the jury members would
hesitate to find the [defendants] guilty even if the evidence proved
their guilt.”178
Similarly, the Seventh Circuit recently disagreed with a
defendant’s contention that the jury couldn’t make a “discriminating
appraisal” of the witnesses’ biases without knowing the exact length
of the mandatory minimum sentence he faced absent cooperation.179
The district court did not permit the defendant to introduce to the jury
that the witness was facing a twenty-year minimum sentence, although
it did allow the defendant to refer to the sentence as “substantial.”180
The Eighth Circuit has held similarly. In United States v.
Walley,181 the district court did not permit defense counsel to ask the
cooperating witness about his forty-year maximum sentence or his
five-year mandatory minimum sentence, finding that this was a way
to reveal to the jury the possible sentences that the defendant faced.182
The district court did, however, allow defense counsel to indicate that
the witness faced a “significant sentence.”183 The Court of Appeals
held that informing the jury that the witness faced a possible five-year
sentence as opposed to calling the sentence “significant,” would not
have given the jury a “significantly different impression” of the
witness’s credibility.184
B. The Minority Approach
A minority of U.S. Circuit Courts have held that inquiry into the
details of a cooperating witness’s agreement with the government is
necessary to expose to the jury potential biases and afford defendants
their confrontation rights.185
1. The Fifth Circuit
The Fifth Circuit has held that a district court’s wide discretion in
limiting cross-examination is, in turn, limited “by the requirements of
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

Id.
United States v. Trent, 863 F.3d 699, 703 (7th Cir. 2017).
Id.
567 F.3d 354 (8th Cir. 2009).
Id. at 359.
Id.
Id. at 360.
United States v. Dimora, 843 F. Supp. 2d 799, 843 (N.D. Ohio 2012).
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the Sixth Amendment.”186 Recognizing the importance of exposing
cooperating witnesses’ potential biases, the court has reversed rulings
which have prevented the disclosure of information related to
witnesses’ efforts to avoid the penalties they would face in the absence
of cooperation with the government.187
In United States v. Landerman,188 five defendants challenged
their ability to cross-examine a government witness about pending
felony charges in state court.189 The witness had pleaded guilty to two
counts of fraud in federal court related to the defendants’ charges, and
had an unrelated pending drug charge in state court.190
Outside the presence of the jury, defense counsel asked the
witness whether he believed the government would make a favorable
recommendation to the state prosecutor in exchange for his
cooperation in the federal case.191 The district court barred the
admission of this testimony into evidence, finding that it was unduly
prejudicial.192 The Court of Appeals reversed, reasoning that “the jury,
as the trier of fact, should have been allowed to draw its own
inferences regarding [the witness’s] credibility and determine what
effect, if any, the pending criminal charge had on [his] motivation to
testify.”193
2. The Third Circuit
The Third Circuit has made similar rulings. In United States v.
Chandler,194 the defendant was charged with conspiracy to distribute
and possess with intent to distribute cocaine.195 The defendant’s coconspirators pleaded guilty and cooperated with the government to
testify against her at trial.196 Defense counsel attempted to solicit
information about the witnesses’ sentence reductions and agreements

186. United States v. Cooks, 52 F.3d 101, 103 (5th Cir. 1995) (quoting United States v.
Garcia, 13 F.3d 1464, 1468 (11th Cir. 1994)).
187. See, e.g., id. at 101; United States v. Landerman, 109 F.3d 1053 (5th Cir. 1997).
188. 109 F.3d 1053 (5th Cir. 1997).
189. Id. at 1061.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 1062.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. 326 F.3d 210 (3d Cir. 2003).
195. Id. at 212.
196. Id. at 213.
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with the government.197 However, the district court “substantially
restricted” defense counsel’s efforts to do so.198
The first witness, Sylvester, had dealt about five kilos of cocaine,
but was charged with only a three-ounce sale in exchange for his
cooperation with the government.199 During cross-examination,
Sylvester testified “that he could have been charged for trafficking in
much larger quantities” than the three ounces that he was ultimately
charged for.200 The second witness, Yearwood, had pleaded guilty to
trafficking anywhere from fifteen to fifty pounds of cocaine.201
Yearwood had not yet been sentenced at the time of the defendant’s
trial, but testified that she hoped her sentence would be reduced for
agreeing to testify against the defendant.202 The district court denied
defense counsel the opportunity to ask the witnesses what sentences
they had avoided and hoped to avoid in exchange for cooperating with
the government.203
The Third Circuit found that the jury would have received a
“significantly different impression” of Chandler’s co-conspirators had
her counsel been permitted to expose the “magnitude” of their
potential sentence reductions.204 The court concluded that excluding
information about these reductions, which would “expose to the jury
the facts from which [they] . . . could appropriately draw inferences”
about the co-conspirators’ credibility, violated the Sixth
Amendment’s Confrontation Clause.205 The court acknowledged that
exposing the jury to information about the witnesses’ potential
sentences could lead to nullification, but found that nullification is
outweighed by the defendant’s right to cross-examine.206
3. The Ninth Circuit
More recently, the Ninth Circuit followed this line of reasoning
in an en banc decision, finding constitutional error when the district
court disallowed defense counsel to explore a cooperating witness’s
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

Id. at 216.
Id.
Id. at 216–17.
Id. at 217.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 218.
Id. at 222.
Id.
Id. at 223.
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mandatory minimum life sentence.207 In United States v. Larson,208
four defendants—Poitra, Lamere, Larson, and Laverdure—were each
charged with one count of conspiracy to possess with intent to
distribute methamphetamine.209 Poitra and Lamere pleaded guilty and
agreed to cooperate with the government.210 In light of his two prior
felony drug convictions, Lamere faced a mandatory minimum
sentence of life without the possibility of release.211 Poitra faced a
mandatory minimum of five years.212
The district court shut down defense counsel’s attempts to solicit
information about the witnesses’ respective mandatory sentences.213
The Ninth Circuit held that the restriction of Poitra’s crossexamination about her five-year mandatory minimum was warranted
and did not violate the defendants’ confrontation rights because
defense counsel had a chance to “adequately explore [her] motivation
to lie.”214 In contrast, inquiring into Lamere’s mandatory minimum
life sentence “would [have] reveal[ed] to the jury Lamere’s potential
biases and motivations for testifying against [the] Defendants,” and
therefore contained significant probative value.215 The Court further
explained that:
The potential maximum statutory sentence that a cooperating
witness might receive, however, is fundamentally different
from
the mandatory minimum
sentence
that
the
witness will receive in the absence of a motion by the
Government. The former lacks significant probative force
because a defendant seldom receives the maximum penalty
permissible under the statute of conviction. In contrast, the
fact that here a cooperating witness faced a mandatory life
sentence without the possibility of release in the absence of
a government motion is highly relevant to the witness’
credibility. It is a sentence that the witness knows with
certainty that he will receive unless he satisfies the

207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

United States v. Larson, 495 F.3d 1094, 1107 (9th Cir. 2007).
495 F.3d 1094 (9th Cir. 2007).
Id. at 1097.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1099.
Id. at 1103.
Id. at 1104.
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government with substantial and meaningful cooperation so
that it will move to reduce his sentence.216
V. LIMITING THE CROSS-EXAMINATION OF GOVERNMENT WITNESSES
LIMITS JURIES’ ROLES AND DEFENDANTS’ SIXTH AMENDMENT
RIGHTS
[E]specially broad latitude should be afforded the questioning of
an accomplice now acting as a government witness which concerns
“the nature of any agreement he has with the government or any
expectation or hope that he will be treated leniently in exchange for
his cooperation.”217
The underlying purpose of the Confrontation Clause together
with the means and methods by which the government obtains
cooperating witnesses leads to the following conclusion: the majority
view is severely flawed. First, limiting extensive cross-examination of
witnesses’ cooperation agreements prevents the jury from adequately
assessing the magnitude of witnesses’ biases and credibility. Second,
district courts place these limitations without a proper application of
Federal Rule of Evidence 403, which provides that a “court may
exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by a danger of . . . prejudice.”218 This results in a
conclusory declaration that jury nullification is a substantial risk that
outweighs the probative value of the evidence. Finally, these
limitations violate criminal defendants’ Sixth Amendment
confrontation rights.
The following sections will explain why the majority’s approach
infringes on defendants’ Sixth Amendment rights, and how jury
nullification is a trivial concern that is substantially outweighed by the
probative value of cooperation agreement evidence.
A. Jury Nullification: The Lesser of Two Evils
The majority has voiced the concern that when juries are
informed of the specific sentences witnesses have avoided or hope to
avoid by testifying, they attribute those sentences to the defendant and
nullify as a result.219 These courts’ decisions to limit cross216.
217.
218.
219.

Id. at 1106 (footnotes omitted).
United States v. Lynn, 856 F.2d 430, 433 (1st Cir. 1988).
FED. R. EVID. 403.
See United States v. Dimora, 843 F. Supp. 2d 799, 843 (N.D. Ohio 2012).
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examination rest largely upon this proposition. However, the courts
fail to account for a host of questions that accompany such a broad
statement. What factors in a criminal case account for jury
nullification? And most importantly, how often do those factors
actually contribute to nullification?
Multiple studies have shown that jury nullification is not as
common as critics contend.220 A study conducted by scholars at the
National Center for State Courts gathered data from 372 felony jury
trials in the Bronx, Los Angeles, Phoenix, and Washington D.C.221
The data revealed that the jury nullified in only 0.5 percent of the cases
in which there was strong prosecution evidence but “low juror
perceptions of legal fairness,” and in only 2 percent of the cases in
which there was ambiguous evidence.222 An Oxford University study
of more than 300 jury trials concluded that juries generally acquit due
to the prosecution’s failure “to provide enough information or to
present it in court in a way that would convince” the jury “of the
defendant’s guilt.”223 Thus, it appears that the driving force behind
jury nullification is the prosecution’s flawed case presentation.
Jury nullification exists despite strong evidence of guilt, but is
“limited and principled.”224 For example, juries may nullify when
“defendants are arrested for protesting an immoral war, physically
disabling a would-be murderer, or assisting the suicide of a terminally
ill patient.”225 Juries also nullify where a case “involve[s] a serious
offense, a young victim, and an unemployed defendant.”226 Even so,
those “deviations [are] not excessive[,] . . . widespread, nor
routine.”227
What is more, courts have at their disposal various methods by
which to prevent or mitigate the risk of nullification. For example,
judges may provide an instruction that “the jury must impartially apply
and follow the law, no matter what.”228 Courts may also prohibit
220. DENNIS J. DEVINE, JURY DECISION MAKING: THE STATE OF THE SCIENCE 70–71 (2012).
221. Id. at 71.
222. Id.
223. VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 154 (1986).
224. Id.
225. DEVINE, supra note 220, at 69.
226. HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 223, at 154.
227. Id.
228. Aaron McKnight, Jury Nullification as a Tool to Balance the Demands of Law and Justice,
2013 BYU L. REV. 1103, 1110 (2014) (citing Lawrence W. Crispo, et al., Jury Nullification: Law
Versus Anarchy, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1, 56 (1997)).
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counsel from making any mention of a jury’s right to nullify in closing
arguments.229 Extensive voir dire examination to filter jurors likely to
engage in nullification is also a viable option.230
Additionally, as further discussed in Part V.B, infra, principled
nullification is sometimes necessary and fulfills the jury’s democratic
function in acting as a check on the government. Indeed, the Supreme
Court has found “that when juries differ with the result at which the
judge would have arrived, it is usually because they are serving some
of the very purposes for which they were created.”231 Thus, the
majority’s concern that comprehensive cross-examination of
witnesses’ cooperation agreements results in jury nullification is
without merit.
B. Probative Value & The Jury’s Dual Function
“The purpose of a jury is to guard against the exercise of arbitrary
power—to make available the commonsense judgment of the
community as a hedge against the overzealous or mistaken prosecutor
and in preference to the professional or perhaps overconditioned or
biased response of a judge.”232
The Sixth Amendment provides criminal defendants another vital
guarantee: the right to a jury trial.233 Juries are meant to perform both
communitarian and democratic functions.234 As representatives of the
public, juries “participate in the administration of justice”235 by
carrying the “shared responsibility” of determining a criminal
defendant’s “guilt or innocence.”236 This determination rests heavily
upon weighing the credibility and potential biases of testifying
witnesses. In fact, jury deliberation is one of the most critical methods
through which witness credibility is tested.237

229. Id. (citing Major Bradley J. Huestis, Jury Nullification: Calling for Candor from the Bench
and Bar, 173 MIL. L. REV. 68, 89–94 (2002)).
230. Id. at 1111 (citing Lawrence W. Crispo, et al., Jury Nullification: Law Versus Anarchy, 31
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1, 54–55 (1997)).
231. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 157 (1968).
232. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975).
233. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
234. Jenny Carroll, The Jury as a Democracy, 66 ALA. L. REV. 825, 830 (2015).
235. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 406 (1991).
236. Brown v. Louisiana, 447 U.S. 323, 330 (1980) (quoting Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78,
87 (1970)).
237. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 318 (1974).
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The Supreme Court declared that the right to a jury trial is
“granted . . . in order to prevent oppression by the Government.”238 As
a democracy, criminal juries provide “indispensable protection against
the possibility of governmental oppression.”239 Serving on a jury
instills in the public a “conscious duty” to “guard the rights” of parties
and “prevent [the] arbitrary use or abuse” of the criminal justice
system.240 Juries provide a “safeguard against the corrupt or
overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric
judge.”241 At its core, a criminal jury makes “judicial or prosecutorial
unfairness less likely.”242
A government witness that poses the danger of providing
unreliable testimony is the prime example of a threat that juries are
meant to police.243 Courts alert juries to the possibility of untruthful
witnesses. For example, the Ninth Circuit model instructions provide
that “the witness’s interest in the outcome of the case . . . the witness’s
bias or prejudice . . . [and] any other factors that bear on believability”
should be considered in giving weight to testimony.244 Similarly, the
Sixth Circuit model instructions urge the jury to consider whether “the
witness had any relationship to the government or the defendant, or
anything to gain or lose from the case . . . any bias, or prejudice, or
reason for testifying that might cause the witness to lie or slant the
testimony in favor of one side or the other.”245
Moreover, juries are often advised to “consider . . . with more
caution” testimony where the witness has immunity or is an
238. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155 (1968).
239. Brown, 447 U.S. at 330 (citing Williams, 399 U.S. at 87) (“[T]he concept of relying on a
body of one’s peers to determine guilt or innocence [is] a safeguard against arbitrary law
enforcement.”).
240. Powers, 499 U.S. at 406–07 (citation omitted); Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 310
(1922).
241. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 156.
242. Id. at 158; see also Kristen K. Sauer, Informed Conviction: Instructing the Jury About
Mandatory Sentencing Consequences, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1232, 1253 (1995) (“Supreme Court
jurisprudence demonstrates that jury-control practices that seek to limit the jury’s role to mere
factfinder . . . [are] impermissible in the criminal context if they interfere with the jury’s political
function under the Sixth Amendment as buffer against potential governmental abuses.”).
243. NATAPOFF, supra note 97, at 76 (“[T]he jury remains one of the American system’s most
important checks on informant reliability.”).
244. Ninth Circuit Jury Instructions Committee, Manual of Model Criminal Jury Instructions
for the District Courts of the Ninth Circuit 8 (Dec. 2017), http://www3.ce9.uscourts.gov/juryinstructions/sites/default/files/WPD/Criminal_Instructions_2017_12.pdf.
245. Sixth Circuit Committee on Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions, Pattern Criminal Jury
Instructions (Dec. 20. 2017), http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/sites/ca6/files/documents/pattern_jury/
pdf/crmpattjur_full.pdf.
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accomplice or codefendant with a cooperation agreement.246 Judges
even inform the jury that such witnesses “may have a reason to make
a false statement in order to strike a good bargain with the
Government.”247
Notwithstanding these guidelines, the majority of U.S. courts still
decline to provide the jury with the tools necessary to properly conduct
such a cautionary assessment. For a jury to fully determine the
magnitude of a particular witness’s credibility and bias, it must be
supplied with all information with which it can make an informeddecision. And if a jury is to combat “judicial or prosecutorial
unfairness,”248 revealing a witness’s cooperation agreement with the
government provides a crucial method in doing so. Thus, it defeats
logic to assume that information about witnesses’ sentence reductions
or charge alterations lacks the requisite probative value necessary for
admission into evidence.
Suppose there are two cooperating witnesses that provide
conflicting testimonies. One witness testifies in exchange for the
reduction of a mandatory minimum 25-year sentence, whereas the
other witness hopes to avoid a mandatory maximum 5-year sentence.
The first witness, who knows that he certainly faces 25 years behind
bars, clearly has a stronger incentive to ensure his testimony “pleases”
the prosecutor. Conversely, the other witness knows that he will
probably receive even less than the maximum 5-year sentence, and
might be less likely to lie as a result.249 Assuming both witnesses are
credible in all other respects, how can the jury determine which
testimony to afford more weight? Clearly, such information directly
speaks to motive, bias, and prejudice.250
246. Judicial Council of the United States Eleventh Judicial Circuit, Eleventh Circuit Pattern
Jury Instructions (Criminal Cases) (2016), http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/court
docs/clk/FormCriminalPatternJuryInstructions2016Rev.pdf.
247. Id.
248. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 158 (1968).
249. See United States v. Larson, 495 F.3d 1094, 1106 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding that mandatory
minimum sentences lack minimum force because defendants “seldom” receive the maximum
sentence permissible).
250. This is not to suggest that witnesses’ sentences or punishments directly correlate with their
truthfulness on the stand. Detailed information about cooperation agreements should be used in
conjunction with a juror’s “common sense” and “everyday experience,” as well as other indicators
of credibility, including the witness’s memory, demeanor, and consistency of the testimony. See
United States v. Larson, 495 F.3d 1094, 1106 (9th Cir. 2007). However, “common sense” dictates
that a witness has a lot to lose if his cooperation agreement fails, and thus, his incentive to stretch
the truth may significantly increase.
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The risk posed by prohibiting the admission of such evidence is
even more elevated when the conflicting testimonies are those of the
defendant and the cooperating accomplice. Brown v. Powell251 is
illustrative. There, the defendant, Brown, and the prosecution’s main
witness, Warner, were involved in the murder of Watson.252
According to Brown, the two visited Watson in his apartment.253
When an argument ensued between Watson and Warner, Brown
interfered.254 Watson hit Brown, and in response, Brown struck
Watson on the head “several times.”255 Warner and Brown then
dragged Watson to his car, placed him in the trunk, drove him to a
nearby river, and threw his body into the river.256 At this point Watson
was still alive, but he later drowned.257 Brown was ultimately charged
with first-degree murder and Warner was charged with accomplice to
first-degree murder, which carries the same sentence.258 Pursuant to a
cooperation agreement, Warner pleaded guilty to manslaughter and
accepted a 15 to 30-year maximum prison sentence.259
At trial, “Warner testified that he never fought with Watson.”260
Brown repudiated his police statement and stated that “because he
feared Warner, he had falsely told the police that he, not Warner, was
the chief offender.”261 Thus, their testimonies became directly
conflicting. On cross-examination, Warner admitted that he currently
faced a 15 to 30-year maximum sentence for manslaughter, and that
he knowingly avoided a first-degree charge.262 The trial court,
however, did not allow defense counsel to ask Warner what penalty
first-degree murder entailed.263 The First Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed, finding that the jury was presented with “ample evidence”
to assess Warner’s credibility.264

251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.

975 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1992).
Id. at 2–3.
Id. at 2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2–3.
Id. at 3.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 4.
Id.
Id. at 5–6.
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While the jury was presented extensive evidence alluding to
Warner’s possible biases, the trial judge struck evidence that arguably
“mattered most.”265 The fact that Warner’s alternative to the
manslaughter charge was life in prison without parole could have
alerted the jury to the possibility that Warner’s testimony was
untruthful, and that he shifted all of the blame onto Brown.
Brown and its progeny demonstrate that evidence of cooperating
witnesses’ sentence reductions or charge alterations carries probative
value insofar as it assists the jury in performing its dual function.
Limiting this inquiry paints an incomplete picture and restricts the
jury’s ability to perform its communitarian function and assess witness
credibility and bias. More importantly, preventing the jury from
obtaining full disclosure of a witness’s cooperation agreement
severely thwarts its democratic function. This is especially concerning
given that prosecutors choose their witnesses carefully and
strategically, and that plea deals are subject to withdrawal by the
prosecutor. A jury cannot act as a check on the prosecutor’s abusive
practices without a complete understanding of those practices. In fact,
in Hoffa v. United States266 the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of the use of cooperating witnesses in large part
because it found the jury and cross-examination are “established
safeguards of the Anglo-American legal system” and shields against
the practice’s many shortcomings.267
Finally, to the extent that a jury might nullify upon learning this
information, nullification in that context is perhaps essential in
fulfilling the jury’s democratic function. Considering the broad
discretion that police and prosecutors have in pressing charges and
recruiting witnesses and the “very little review” their discretion
undergoes, nullification may “weed out inappropriate prosecutions
where police and prosecutors failed to do so.”268 Thus, in almost all
circumstances, the threat of jury nullification posed by detailed
information about cooperation agreements is substantially outweighed
by its probative value.

265.
266.
267.
268.

Id. at 7.
385 U.S. 293 (1966).
Id. at 311.
See McKnight, supra note 228, at 1127.
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C. The Van Arsdall Test and the Unconstitutionality of the Majority
View
The test articulated in Delaware v. Van Arsdall provides strong
support to the minority view that limiting cross-examination about
cooperation agreements is a violation of the supreme right of
confrontation.269 As demonstrated supra, extensive cross-examination
about cooperation agreements is “otherwise appropriate”270 insofar as
the risk for jury nullification is outweighed by its probative value and
falls within the permissible scope of Federal Rule of Evidence 611.271
The minor risks that such cross-examination poses “must fall before
the right of [a criminal defendant] to seek out the truth in the process
of defending himself.”272
In addition, cooperating witness testimony contains a
“prototypical form of bias”273 since it is precisely this type of witness
that presents a risk of providing untruthful testimony.274 Finally, by
limiting such cross-examination, courts prevent defendants from
“expos[ing] to the jury the facts from which” juries may assess the
“reliability of the witness.”275 Thus, cross-examination of government
witnesses with respect to their cooperation agreements certainly falls
within the “constitutionally required threshold level of inquiry” that
must be “afforded [to a] defendant.”276
VI. PROPOSAL
“[T]he right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses
contributes to the establishment of a system of criminal justice in
which the perception as well as the reality of fairness prevails.”277
Courts should establish a uniform rule that allows defendants to
comprehensively cross-examine government witnesses about their
cooperation agreements; specifically, defendants should be permitted
to inquire about the precise sentences and/or charges that witnesses
avoided or hoped to avoid by cooperating with the government. Such
269. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 680 (1986).
270. See id.
271. FED. R. EVID. 611 (“Cross-examination should not go beyond the subject matter of the
direct examination and matters affecting the witness’s credibility.”).
272. See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 320 (1974).
273. See Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 680.
274. NATAPOFF, supra note 97, at 70.
275. See Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 680.
276. See Brown v. Powell, 975 F.2d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 1992) (Pollak, J., dissenting).
277. Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 540 (1986).
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a rule will create consistency in criminal trials across the nation and
afford defendants “so vital a constitutional right [to expose the] . . .
bias of an adverse witness.”278 Exposing the bias of cooperating
witnesses will be beneficial for the jury in determining what weight to
afford witness testimony in the process of deciding a defendant’s guilt
or innocence.
A uniform rule will also safeguard defendants from prosecutors’
autonomous powers in charging and securing cooperation agreements.
It is undisputable that the government has the upper hand in obtaining
witnesses. In fact, defendants, unlike the government, are not able to
secure a cooperation deal in exchange for testimony.279 This rule
would balance the playing field. Defendants would be able to expose
any relevant information that may alert the jury of overreaching by
prosecutors and “assur[e] that individuals whose conduct is unlawful,
yet less than fully blameworthy, do not get punished unjustly.”280 In
addition, if prosecutors know that cooperation agreements will
undergo scrutiny from the jury, they would likely exercise more
caution and fairness in the process of obtaining cooperating witnesses.
Hence, the gains from establishing a uniform rule heavily outweigh
any of its possible shortcomings.
To offset the concern that juries might confuse the issues or
nullify, courts should provide limiting jury instructions. These
instructions should inform jurors that such information should be used
solely for the purpose of evaluating credibility, bias, and prejudice.
Judges might also mandate that jurors avoid presuming a defendant’s
sentence based upon the information they learn about a witness’s
agreement. Finally, jurors should be reminded that it is the defendant
who is on trial, not the cooperating witness.
VII. CONCLUSION
There is a split among the U.S. circuit courts regarding the
permissible scope of cross-examination with respect to government
witnesses.281 The majority view is that defendants should not be
permitted to cross-examine cooperating witnesses about the precise
278. See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 320 (1974).
279. NATAPOFF, supra note 97, at 49.
280. Sauer, supra note 242, at 1255 (citing HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE
AMERICAN JURY 308 (1971)).
281. See United States v. Dimora, 843 F. Supp. 2d 799, 843 (N.D. Ohio 2012).
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benefits they hope to gain in exchange for testifying.282 The minority
view is that preventing defendants from inquiring about the details of
cooperation agreements violates their Sixth Amendment confrontation
rights.283
This Note argues that in addition to a constitutional violation,
such prohibition distorts the function of the jury, and gives more
discretion to the prosecutor. This Note also proposes establishing a
uniform rule: defendants must be given the full opportunity to crossexamine government witnesses about their cooperation agreements.
Limiting jury instructions should be provided to address any potential
concerns that this rule would raise. Hopefully, the Supreme Court will
resolve this issue accordingly in its upcoming terms.

282. Id.
283. Id.

